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ESSAY: WEIGHING THE POTENTIAL OF
CITIZEN REDISTRICTING
Justin Levitt*
As they do every ten years, this year state legislatures across the
country are redrawing legislative district lines to reflect population
shifts and ensure equal representation for each district. In 2010,
California voters passed a proposition granting the California Citizens
Redistricting Commission control over the drawing of congressional
lines. This Symposium Essay examines the potential for redistricting by
an independent group of citizens such as the Citizens Redistricting
Commission. First, it explores the nature of the redistricting process, a
process often explained as fundamentally political, and argues, instead,
that the process is both political and pre-political. This Essay then
examines incumbent legislators’ roles in the redistricting process in
light of this insight, and challenges the presumption that incumbents
are more accountable to members of their districts because of
redistricting. Finally, this Essay reviews various alternatives to
incumbent control of the redistricting process, and both the positive and
negative potential of citizen redistricting.

* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I would like to thank Rick
Hasen, Aziz Huq, Allan Ides, Cameron Schroeder, and the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review for enormously helpful comments and suggestions. All errors, of course, are my
own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Redistricting—the act of drawing and redrawing legislative
districts as population shifts, to ensure roughly equal representation
for each district—is once again upon the nation. In 2011,
jurisdictions across the country will again redraw the lines that
determine the representation they will receive. And with each new
redistricting cycle, the debate arises anew about whether the
procedures used are well suited to effectuate the public’s interest in
the process.
The 2010 California elections offered a particularly salient
opportunity to reflect on the manner in which redistricting is
conducted. In 2008, Californians narrowly passed Proposition 11,
which removed the state legislature’s control over the lines of its
members’ own districts, and delivered that control instead to a
commission of citizens without direct ties to officials whose jobs
depend on the way the lines are drawn. 1 Two years later, two new
propositions appeared on the general-election ballot. One measure
granted the new citizens’ commission control over drawing
congressional lines as well. 2 The other would have eliminated the
commission entirely. 3
This Essay takes California’s choice as inspiration to examine
more generally the potential for redistricting by an independent
group of citizens. In Part II, it explores the nature of the redistricting
process. Often, this process is explained as fundamentally political,

1. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4,
2008: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 70–73, 137–40 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 OFFICIAL
VOTER GUIDE], available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/pdf-guide/vig-nov2008-principal.pdf; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE, NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL
ELECTION 7 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/
sov_complete.pdf (providing votes for and against state ballot measures in California’s 2008
general election).
2. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 2,
2010: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 18–23, 95–97 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 VOTER
INFORMATION GUIDE], available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/pdf/english/complete-vig.pdf.
This measure (Proposition 20) passed, by a final vote count of approximately 60 percent to 40
percent. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION: STATEMENT OF VOTE 90
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 STATEMENT OF VOTE], available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/
sov/2010-general/complete-sov.pdf.
3. 2010 VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 2, at 62–67, 115–21. This measure
(Proposition 27) failed, also by approximately 60 percent to 40 percent. 2010 STATEMENT OF
VOTE, supra note 2, at 96.
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and therefore particularly suited to execution by politicians. I argue,
instead, that the process is both political and pre-political; it not only
flows from, but also defines, the jurisdiction’s relevant political
cleavages. Part III then examines incumbent legislators’ role in the
redistricting process in light of this insight, including a normative
assessment of skills and predilections that incumbents may bring to
bear. Part IV follows with a brief review of various alternatives to
incumbent control of the redistricting process, capped by a more
thorough review of the potential—both positive and negative—for
citizen redistricting.
II. THE NATURE OF THE REDISTRICTING PROCESS
Every ten years, after the U.S. Census Bureau releases its
demographic portrait of the country, jurisdictions throughout the
nation reallocate political power among their constituents. In most
jurisdictions, districts define the groups of individuals represented in
legislative assemblies by federal, state, and local officials. By
constitutional command, those districts must be of roughly equal
size, preserving equality of representation. 4 And so, to keep up with
an itinerant public, jurisdictions redraw the lines of their
representatives’ districts after every census to ensure population
equality.
This redistricting is commonly said to be a fundamentally
political enterprise. It is political in the colloquial partisan sense, in
that this is the arena in which competing Republican and Democratic
partisans have conducted their most pitched battles, jousting with
each other to divvy electoral turf in the most advantageous manner.
And it is political in a more inherent sense, in that multiple complex
tradeoffs are required among multiple goals, with no outcome that
clearly serves all of the population equally. Those who redistrict may
weigh raw population count, racial and ethnic representation,
partisan composition, municipal and geographic boundaries, sprawl
and concentration, and communities of shared interests among the
factors determining where district lines should fall. Each factor may
have a legitimate role in determining a district’s bounds, depending

4. See Avery v. Midland Cnty., Tex., 390 U.S. 474, 478 (1968) (discussing local
government districts); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 539 (1964) (discussing state legislative
districts); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 13 (1964) (discussing congressional districts).
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on different contested conceptions about what representation should
accomplish. Each factor will also be applied in ways yielding
partisan or personal repercussions for incumbents seeking reelection
from these new districts. And all of these factors cannot sensibly be
reconciled with each other in the same way or to the same degree
throughout the sprawl of a diverse state. Choosing which interests to
prioritize in which locations involves a complicated negotiation
among competing factions with plausible claims that their
preferences best represent public welfare. 5
From one vantage point, therefore, this process looks political in
much the same way that all other public policy decisions are
political. Citizens entrust representatives 6 to negotiate complicated
and multifaceted decisions about providing and distributing a public
good. In the redistricting context, the good in question is legislative
representation; in other contexts, it might be public defense or health
care or environmental protection. In this view, redistricting decisions
are normal political outputs: translations of public preferences about
representation, subject to all of the recurring epistemological
quandaries and imperfections of the regular translation process. 7
From another vantage point, however, the redistricting process
looks “pre-political” in a way that most other public acts are not. 8
That is, redistricting decisions are not only outputs of a translation
process but also part of the translation algorithm itself. Redistricting
5. See, e.g., Steven Huefner, Don’t Just Make Redistricters More Accountable to the
People, Make Them the People, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 53–54 (2010).
6. In most American jurisdictions, the group entrusted with this choice is defined by a
majority of legislators (subject to executive veto), themselves chosen by pluralities of voters in
electoral districts established during prior cycles.
7. See, e.g., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
8. This Essay borrows the term from Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The
Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1,
4 (1985). Professors Lowenstein and Steinberg, however, use the term to define common
“principles [that] are generally accepted as constituting the ground rules of the political struggle,”
and that have broad consensus among the governed. Id. at 75. Here, I expand the term to embrace
ground rules that shape the nature and products of representation, even when the choice of any
particular system is vigorously contested. For example, the choice of legislative procedures (e.g.,
a majority or supermajority requirement) or voting systems (not the machinery for recording
votes, but rather the method of aggregating preferences, like single-member plurality voting or
multi-member ranked-choice voting) may be among the rules that qualify as pre-political, with or
without more general consensus. It is not necessary to claim that the categories of political and
pre-political are mutually exclusive to recognize that acts with a pre-political quality may deserve
distinct treatment. In a future article, I hope to further explore the nature and bounds of prepolitical acts and the implications of entrusting different institutions with such actions.
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reorders how citizens are grouped for representational purposes. If,
as is the case in most American jurisdictions, a bare plurality of the
voters within a given district selects a single representative, slight
changes in a district’s composition may generate substantial changes
in that district’s choice of representative—and therefore in the
interests most vigorously represented for that district. 9 In the
aggregate, changes in the district lines can result in significant shifts
in the policy preferences of a legislative majority. Redistricting is a
single public act with the ability to shift the terrain on which all
future political activity is negotiated. It does so by shifting political
power among the groups within a jurisdiction that have the capacity
to see their preferences translated into policy. 10 Redistricting changes
the aggregation of political preferences and the way that those
preferences play out through the remainder of the political process,
even when no individual constituent’s interests have changed. And as
such, redistricting is pre-political.
III. THE ROLE OF EXISTING LEGISLATORS
In the system described above, existing legislators have at best a
conflicted role in determining where district lines are to be drawn. To
the extent that redistricting is a political act like any other, of course,
the default presumption is that the legislature is best equipped to
make the necessary decisions. In this vein, we are frequently told that
redistricting is best left to the political bodies otherwise tasked with
resolving similarly complex public policy matters. 11 And so it is that
most American jurisdictions allow their legislatures to control this
fundamental process.

9. Alternatively, incumbents may shift the policies they promote, in order to reflect the
developing composition of the districts in which they reside. In either case, a change in the
grouping of constituents has the capacity to drive significant change in the interests primarily
represented in the legislature.
10. The stakes involved in redistricting are magnified when a single legislator is chosen from
each district; under these conditions, each incremental decision to include or exclude citizens
when drawing the district lines may drive changes in the only representation that the district’s
citizens receive. Conversely, when districts are larger, and used to elect multiple representatives
using a voting system responsive to multiple constituencies within the district, the
representational stakes of the redistricting decision decrease.
11. See, e.g., John Marelius, Thousands Apply for State Redistricting Panel, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Jan. 25, 2010, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/jan/25/
thousands-apply-redistricting-panel/.
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To the extent that redistricting is pre-political, however, the
process presents an intriguing conundrum. By grouping different
voters together in different ways, redistricting resets the political
baseline. In some ways, the redistricting process can be seen as an
Etch-a-Sketch for politics, vigorously shaken every ten years, erasing
the existing district map before new lines are drawn. 12 With the slate
clean, it is not clear why legislators elected by obsolete groups of
voters should have presumptive authority to represent the present
public will.
Still, some process is necessary to determine how voters will be
grouped anew into districts. That process, in turn, must either be
conducted or governed by rules set by an entity with representational
legitimacy. Such an entity could be popularly elected. But if the
redistricting entity comprises any significant number of
representatives, the number of choices would quickly become
overwhelming. It would be possible to narrow the selection pool by
some mechanism—like, for example, districts. However, this would
require an entity to draw those district lines . . . , and so on.
Casting about for another representationally legitimate
mechanism to draw district lines quickly leads back to the
legislature. Even if the pre-political nature of the process deprives
the legislature of an inherently privileged redistricting role, the
legislature remains the most obvious existing representative
institution to represent the public in this process. Legislators tend to
know the areas that they represent quite well and will likely
understand the relevant local cleavages better than most other
citizens. If they have been in office for the decade since the last
redrawing of the maps, they may well have expertise in the technical
requirements of the redistricting process, which can be quite
complex. If representational stability is its own substantive benefit,
incumbent legislators have very natural incentives to keep their own
existing districts’ cores intact. 13 And most important for the
12. There may well be legitimate value in preserving the bulk of a district from redistricting
cycle to redistricting cycle, but that is a substantive value to be weighed against others (such as
population equality, racial and ethnic representation, or partisan composition) and dependent on
different theories about what representation should best attempt to achieve. There is no reason
inherent to the redistricting process why it should begin from the status quo rather than from a
clean slate.
13. Of course, just as each incumbent legislator has a natural incentive to preserve her own
district, she may also have natural incentives to dismantle the districts of competitors or
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argument above, the members of the legislature have been elected
and thereby seem to have legitimacy to act on behalf of the public.
Yet upon closer examination, this legitimacy has limits in the
redistricting process that are not present in other contexts. Legislators
are elected by members of their districts but are not accountable to
them—at least, not to the same group of them—for their redistricting
decisions. First, it strains credulity to believe that any legislator
would in practice be removed from office because of the way in
which she conducted redistricting. But more fundamentally, even if
the public actually voted on the basis of redistricting performance,
the public to which any legislator is ostensibly accountable for her
redistricting decision disappears by virtue of the redistricting process.
That is, redistricting performed by a representative on behalf of a
particular group of constituents is necessarily an act that those
constituents cannot review, because redistricting reshapes the
represented group before the next election. The group of citizens
who elect a legislator in 2020 to perform redistricting is necessarily
different from the group that would, in 2022, evaluate that
legislator’s redistricting performance. 14 When the question at hand is
whether new citizen groupings have been created in the public
interest, asking a plurality of the new citizen grouping to evaluate its
own merit as a representative unit is an inherently problematic path
to accountability for the process.
Moreover, legislative control of the districting Etch-a-Sketch
creates a uniquely robust risk of self-dealing. The placement of
district lines—any placement of district lines—will have an impact
on the likelihood that a given legislator is reelected. The underlying
composition of a district is not itself destiny: candidates have won
races in districts heavily weighted toward a different political party,
socioeconomic status, or race. But redistricting can make a
candidate’s path significantly easier—or significantly more difficult.
When incumbent legislators control the redistricting process,
their own jobs are at stake more immediately than in other legislation
opponents. See Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68
OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 756 (2007) (describing the Republican targeting of the district of
Representative Martin Frost, one of the “architects” of the previous Democratic gerrymander).
14. Most states will conduct redistricting in the year after the U.S. Census delivers
population data and before the following elections (in this upcoming cycle, redistricting will
usually occur at some point in 2011 or early 2012). NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, at 155 (2009) (reviewing redistricting deadlines).
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impacting the election process. 15 That is, legislators who are placed
in charge of trading off various competing redistricting
considerations are also the same individuals who stand to gain the
most, personally and directly, by including certain residents and
excluding others—whether those residents are voters, supporters, or
rivals. These same individuals also feel most keenly the impact of
belonging to a legislative majority or minority and have an incentive
to ensure, above all considerations other than the politically
favorable composition of their own districts, that other districts are
designed to yield maximum favorable control of the chamber. 16
Moreover, legislative leaders have the opportunity to use the
redistricting process to make reelection exceedingly difficult for
other legislators, either to avenge slights or to remove potential
opponents or competitors. It should not be surprising that legislators
who are permitted to use that power in their self-interest often do so,
even at the expense of that which they perceive to be in the public
interest. 17 Districts drawn within this system are commonly shaped to
reward or punish individual candidates and to promote partisan
fortunes—rather than to foster the most meaningful representation,
by any measure of that concept.
For example, as I have elsewhere recounted:
In 2001, . . . a federal judge described the redistricting
process for Madison County, Illinois, as full of “threats,
15. Flexible candidates are often able to adapt campaign practices strategically to changes
affecting campaign finance rules or election administration procedures. It is much more difficult,
however, to adapt a campaign to a new set of voters with fundamentally different concerns or a
fundamentally different philosophy of government.
16. The incentives to maximize partisan control at the expense of other considerations are
present whether or not the party controlling the legislature reflects the statewide partisan
preference. These incentives may be particularly alarming, however, when a statewide minority
has achieved legislative control for the redistricting cycle. For example, in 2000, Georgians cast
53 percent of their total state legislative votes for Republican candidates and cast 55 percent of
their votes statewide for the Republican presidential candidate, but Democrats controlled the
redistricting process—and the incumbents used the process substantially to further personal and
partisan goals. See, e.g., Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1325–31 (N.D. Ga. 2004), aff’d,
542 U.S. 947 (2004); Official Results of the November 7, 2000 General Election, GA. SEC’Y OF
STATE, http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/election_results/2000_1107/summary.htm (last visited
Feb. 28, 2011).
17. In most states, state legislators draw not only state legislative district lines but also the
lines for congressional districts. JUSTIN LEVITT, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 20, 34–
36 (2010). To the extent that, based on partisan or personal ties, state legislators prioritize the
desires of individual members of Congress over the public interest in this process, the limitations
of legislative redistricting apply to congressional districts just as they do to state legislative
districts.
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coercion, bullying, and a skewed view of the law,” with the
process “so far short of representing the electorate that it
seems the citizens of Madison County were not so much as
an afterthought.” Said the redistricting committee chairman
to one of his committee colleagues: “We are going to shove
[the map] up your f------ a-- and you are going to like it, and
I’ll f--- any Republican I can.” 18
With processes like these, it is perhaps little wonder that the United
States is unique among industrialized democracies in putting an
inherent conflict of interest directly at the heart of the redistricting
system. 19
IV. ALTERNATIVES
Scholars, advocates, and even some elected officials have
proposed many alternatives to the standard status quo in which
sitting incumbents redraw their own districts and those of their
competitors, more or less as they please. 20
A. Automation
One proposal that seems to attract recurring attention,
particularly when juxtaposed with existing incumbents’ conflicts of

18. Id. at 13 (footnote omitted) (quoting Hulme v. Madison Cnty., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1041,
1044, 1051 (S.D. Ill. 2001)).
19. Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV.
28, 78–79 (2004).
20. Professor Chris Elmendorf and Professor Michael Kang have each offered extremely
thoughtful proposals to append democracy-enhancing processes to the legislative status quo,
rather than displacing it entirely. Elmendorf suggests an advisory body to provide anchor
legislation, forcing the legislature to react to a default offer that is presumably more squarely in
the public interest than the map the legislature would draw on its own, and cites evidence that
legislatures abroad actually tend to defer to these bodies. Christopher S. Elmendorf,
Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366, 1385–90 (2005). Kang suggests an adjustment on the other end of the
legislative process, holding legislative maps subject to public referendum. Michael S. Kang, DeRigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 667 (2006). Either has the potential to blunt the exercise of legislative self-interest. Yet
given the exceedingly low salience of discrete redistricting decisions for the American general
public, Huefner, supra note 5, at 61 & n.92, and the exceedingly high salience of discrete
redistricting decisions for individual legislators, it is not clear how much legislative restraint
either mechanism would generate if implemented domestically. Still, I hope to consider in future
work a promising combination of the two ideas: offering the public a choice between the
redistricting map of an advisory citizens’ body and the product of the familiar legislative process.
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interest, is automation: 21 the Magical Redistricting Machine that
draws lines, ostensibly without the messy mixed motives of human
involvement. However, there are several reasons to believe that
automation is less adequate in this respect than it may superficially
appear.
The most immediate limitation is computational capacity. Micah
Altman has demonstrated that even if it were possible to prioritize,
reconcile, quantify, and measure each desired input to the
redistricting process, present computing technology might not have
the capacity to generate an optimal redistricting “solution” for most
jurisdictions—and certainly not for a state of California’s size and
complexity. 22 If redistricting is designed to achieve multiple
objectives—and most commentators believe that there are several
worthwhile goals to be achieved in drawing any redistricting plan—it
turns out that the calculations required to identify a single “winning”
plan for a geography of any substantial size are so computationally
complex that they become practically unsolvable by computers under
common conditions. 23
Even if the technological limitation could be solved, however,
automation confronts a deeper philosophical problem. There is no
“neutral” rule for drawing district lines. Each rule implies some
vision of representation or accountability, or some precursor
conception of the actor who should resolve conflicts among different
visions of representation when those conflicts arise. For example, a
rule requiring districts above all else to follow the lines of county
boundaries presumes that it is advantageous for representational
purposes to group citizens by their county residency. Indeed, such a
rule presumes that it is representationally superior to group citizens
by county than to group them by municipality or mathematical
proximity or race or purely at random.

21. For a useful review of proposals that computers be used to conduct or facilitate
redistricting, see generally Micah Altman & Michael McDonald, The Promise and Perils of
Computers in Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 69 (2010).
22. Micah Altman, The Computational Complexity of Automated Redistricting: Is
Automation the Answer?, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 81 (1997).
23. Id. at 101. In response, some have proposed automated solutions that do not seek to
optimize multiple objectives, but instead select at random plans that meet various threshold
conditions. Such a solution is more computationally feasible with present technology but is still
subject to the additional drawbacks discussed below. See Altman & McDonald, supra note 21, at
82–83.
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There is ample debate among scholars, activists, and
practitioners about the role in redistricting of—alone and in
context—the continuity of political representation, the nature of
protection for minority rights, the degree of partisan competition or
partisan inequity, physical proximity or accessibility, and the ability
and desirability of representing homogenous or heterogeneous
communities. Redistricting rules represent different approaches to
working through that debate; some reveal more introspection than
others. Even a hypothetical rule that subjugated all of these concerns
to abstract mathematical principles or geometric shapes would
embrace the non-neutral normative view that each of these concerns
should be subjugated to the abstract mathematical principle or
geometric shape in question because that principle or shape is
assumed to produce representation superior to that achieved by other
means.
Moreover, most potential rules for drawing district lines have
predictable political consequences that may favor a particular party
or set of parties, or a particular candidate or set of candidates, as
compared to some alternative rule. That is, most redistricting laws
not only imply some vision of representation, or theory about whom
should be entrusted to make representational decisions, but will also
likely have a tangible impact on a particular set of actors’ electoral
fortunes. 24 That impact neither makes the choice improper nor
vitiates normative evaluation of the choice. It does, however, render
suspect claims about the normative superiority of certain readily
automated laws or principles based solely on the fact that they may
appear facially to be apolitical.
The desire to strive simultaneously toward multiple objectives
complicates matters further. Local goals with respect to the
composition of individual districts may conflict with statewide goals
pertaining to the nature of, say, the California delegation as a whole.
Goals for individual districts will conflict with each other as well, as
when the desire to present voters with multiple viable options in a
general election confronts the desire to assemble voters with similar
interests in order to encourage representation of an identifiable
character. Resolving these conflicts requires either prioritization or
24. See, e.g., LEVITT, supra note 17, at 55; Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding
Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116
HARV. L. REV. 649, 677 (2002).
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compromise, or both—or both to different degrees, in different
portions of a map.
As a consequence, there is no neutral way to program an
automated machine to draw the district lines. The rules governing
such a machine would represent very real choices about the nature of
representation, including what factors to consider in designing
representation and what factors to forego considering. Positing a
redistricting machine simply moves those choices—currently
resolved most often by incumbents in the shadow of state and federal
legal constraints—to the stage of programming the machine. It does
not remove the need to make the choices in the first place.
Finally, automation poses an additional problem of
measurability. Even if it were possible to achieve consensus on the
multiple and interactive goals of the redistricting process, on their
relative importance, and on the degree to which that relative
importance might vary in different regions of a redistricting map,
translating that consensus to a machine-operable algorithm will
involve some noise. Some of the representational goals may be
translated with comparative precision to standard measures; for
example, if a goal of representation is equalizing representational
access, it is relatively straightforward to find a uniform metric for
measuring the number of individuals within a district, even if there is
inevitably error in the measure. 25 But some goals (e.g., keeping
voters who live close together in the same district) will depend on
approximate proxies (e.g., mathematical measures of geometric
“compactness”). And others (e.g., keeping voters with similar
interests in the same district) will strongly resist ready quantification
even by proxy. Some factors (e.g., determining whether a racial
minority’s votes have, in the totality of the circumstances, been
diluted) may have both quantifiable elements and elements that are
exceedingly difficult to quantify. Weighting the relative priorities of
these restrictions may also require quantifying assessments in a
manner that entails imprecision, because relative priorities are
necessarily imprecise.
In addition, with a drive to quantify for purposes of automated
processing, there will inevitably be a temptation to focus on readily
25. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESEARCH AND PLANS FOR COVERAGE
MEASUREMENT IN THE 2010 CENSUS: INTERIM ASSESSMENT 5 (Robert Bell & Michael L. Cohen
eds., 2007).
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measured factors (e.g., population count) or readily evaluated
measures of those factors (e.g., precisely equal numbers of
individuals), to a degree that may not reflect the factors’ actual
importance. In some circumstances, for example, it may be more
important that districts be only approximately equal in population in
order to ensure flexibility to achieve other important objectives. The
drive to quantify and evaluate for the automation process will likely
exaggerate the importance of mathematical precision even where
such precision is unwarranted.
In these respects, the quest to “solve” the redistricting puzzle for
automation purposes is akin to the quest for the “best” supermarket
produce. Analysts would want to take into account size, shelf life,
cost, color, texture, and taste, among many other factors. Even
assuming that it were possible to reach some agreement on the
relative weights and priorities of these factors, there remains the
thorny measurement issue. Size, shelf life, and cost can be easily
measured and scored. There are quantitative scales for color, but
normative opinions on the “best” color likely vary, and it will be
difficult to score color blends. And while measurements for various
component elements of taste are improving in sophistication, 26
quantification of the whole is still approximate at best—and again,
subject to enormous normative disagreement. If the chosen
measurements and their relative weight are imperfect proxies for our
actual preferences, squeezing the pursuit of the “best” supermarket
produce into a machine-operable model may end up yielding
something other than what we would collectively adjudge the best
produce available. The same is true with redistricting.
B. Strictly Binding Rules
As an alternative to feeding the redistricting process to a
computer, it may seem tempting to confront incumbents’ conflicts of
interest by binding their hands. Such a proposal would define the
redistricting process and substantive criteria so tightly that those with
the pen essentially fill only a ministerial function, carrying out a
result effectively predetermined by the governing rules. In other
26. See, e.g., Andrey Legin et al., Electronic Tongue for Pharmaceutical Analytics, 380
ANALYTICAL & BIOANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY 36 (2004); U. Roy et al., Quantifying Taste Using
a Hydrodynamic Oscillator, 31 INSTRUMENTATION SCI. & TECH. 425 (2003); Kiyoshi Toko,
Taste Sensor, 64 SENSORS AND ACTUATORS B: CHEMICAL 205 (2000).
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words, this proposal would not seek to replace incumbents as the
executors of the process, but would remove so much discretion that
incumbency incentives would become irrelevant.
Converting the redistricting task to a procedure of mechanical
implementation, however, is little different from feeding it to a literal
machine. If discretion is drained from the primary redistricting body,
all of the difficult negotiations to weight objectives and determine
how conflicts among objectives should be resolved in different
portions of the jurisdiction will just be pushed forward into the rules
that the body applies. And if objectives or instructions are articulated
with sufficient specificity to remove all ambiguity—for in any
ambiguity there lies decision-making discretion—there is a
substantial risk that the articulable set of proxies for a multifaceted
particular theory of representation fails to accomplish the intended
objectives as well as would be the case if decision makers were
permitted to tweak around the edges.
Consider, for example, an approach to representation that
generally favored districts comprising individuals living close to
each other, but also attempted to avoid districts fragmenting the
voting power of otherwise cohesive populations with discrete
political interests. If it were possible to come to global agreement on
which objective should prevail, and to what degree, in the event of a
conflict (which would require hard choices about “how close” and
“how cohesive,” among others), it might be possible to devise a set
of strict, discretion-free rules to approximately accomplish the goal.
But even so, in any local geographic area, a slight deviation from the
given general rules might better accomplish both aims. The more
objectives there are, the more likely that the global mechanical
implementing rules have local exceptions that all would prefer.
Reducing discretion to a bare minimum is quite likely to yield
undesired, unintended consequences. 27
C. Redistricting Contests
Another suggested alternative to incumbent-driven redistricting
was proposed recently in Ohio: a redistricting “contest.” This
competition would have offered any member of the public the
opportunity to draw and submit a map to be scored based on
27. See Huefner, supra note 5, at 52–53.
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compliance with several prearranged criteria. The winning map
would have been adopted as the official governing plan. 28
Superficially, such proposals seem to have the virtue of
transparency lacking in a plan simply spit out by a computer or
implemented in a mechanical fashion by incumbents: everyone is
able to see every map submitted and can assess each plan’s score.
Yet in truth, this sort of contest setup essentially duplicates the
automation notion in both of the ideas above and is subject to the
same principal objections.
For example, any objective scoring protocol will recreate the
measurability concerns above: some standards will reflect the
particular goal sought with far more precision than others, and that
fact alone may drive greater prioritization of the more precise
measures than is otherwise warranted. Moreover, the compilation of
the scoring process itself reflects precisely the same choices
necessary to program the Magical Redistricting Machine: if the
scoring process rewards some choices and does not reward others,
that score reflects a decision by some body of individuals about what
should or should not be considered more important in the
redistricting process. As with the machine, the decision process is
simply moved to the stage of determining the scoring formula. There
still remains the question of who makes that decision.
This is not to say that contests have no redeeming features. As I
have written elsewhere, if the population shares a commitment to
certain representational goals, contests that encourage members of
the public to submit plans fulfilling those goals in different ways
provide transparent means to flesh out policy options. 29 If proxies for
measuring those goals can be found with some relative precision,
then individuals can be encouraged to one-up each other en route to a
range of solutions more closely approaching a Pareto-optimal
decision set. 30 And if there is a commitment to establish a pool of
“winners,” rather than a single winning plan, that flexibility may
28. H.R.J. Res. 15, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2010).
29. See Justin Levitt, Drawing the Lines in Ohio: A Big Step Forward, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE
BLOG
(June 24,
2009),
http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/
drawing_the_lines_in_ohio_a_big_step_forward/; Justin Levitt, Drawing the Lines in Ohio: The
Structure of the Competition, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE BLOG (June 22, 2009),
http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/drawing_the_lines_in_ohio_the_structure_of_the_co
mpetition [hereinafter Levitt, Drawing the Lines in Ohio: The Structure of Competition].
30. See Levitt, Drawing the Lines in Ohio: The Structure of the Competition, supra note 29.
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adequately accommodate inevitable imperfections in the proxies or
weighting process necessary for scoring contest results. These are all
significant caveats. And they do not resolve the lingering issue at the
end of such a contest: how to determine which body should decide,
among the pool of winners, which plan will govern district lines for
the next decade.
D. Temporal Shift
The approaches above attempt to resolve the potential for
abused discretion in the redistricting process by removing the
discretion. As shown, however, squeezing the discretionary latitude
from those who execute a redistricting plan simply redirects the
exercise of discretion to an earlier point in the process: important
decisions must be made in order to fashion the inputs to a computer
program, the rules strictly binding legislators, or the scoring system
for a contest. Those who favor these solutions must still decide who
decides.
A different approach to the redistricting conflict might attempt
to resolve the potential for abused discretion by retaining the
discretion but removing the abuse. Professor Adam Cox has
proposed one intriguing approach: retain districting authority by
legislative actors but design the districts for a future date, using
projected demographic estimates and deferring the implementation
of the new map. 31 That is, legislators in 2011 would draw districts
using, say, 2016 population projections, with the resulting districts to
take effect in 2016. In theory, the projected data and deferred
implementation would reduce incumbent legislators’ ability to selfdeal effectively. In designing one’s own optimal district, it is a
relatively trivial matter to tailor the district lines to demographic and
political trends of the moment; it may be more difficult to anticipate
such trends with precision several years down the road. Moreover,
beyond the general composition of a district’s population,
incumbents would find it far more difficult to identify and target
promising candidates who threaten a challenge years from now than
it is to target challengers on the immediate horizon.

31. Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions, 5 ELECTION L.J. 412, 412 (2006).
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Cox also notes that the decreased capacity for self-dealing may
accompany decreased motivation for self-dealing. 32 For example, the
redistricting payoff may be less viscerally compelling when the
rewards of implementation are somewhat deferred. In addition,
legislators—particularly state legislators currently vested with
redistricting authority—may have their sights on different political
offices and may thus have less desire to run for office in five years
from the particular districts they are drawing.
Nevertheless, though Cox’s temporal veil may usefully reduce
incumbents’ incentive and capacity for self-dealing, it does not
eliminate either. Deferring implementation for more than a few years
renders demographic projections little more than guesswork and
undermines the ability to adjust district lines in a way that reflects
real population changes—which is, after all, the original rationale for
redistricting. And deferring for only a few years still allows savvy
incumbents to further personal or partisan interests at the expense of
the public interest, albeit with a blunted tool. This is particularly true
with respect to redistricting aimed not at improving one’s own
fortunes but at worsening the opposition’s lot. Even when designing
districts for the future, it is not difficult to fragment an opposing
legislator’s existing constituents or pair two existing incumbents in
the same district, for no reason other than to impact the opposing
incumbents’ political fortunes.
E. Nonpartisan Bodies
Another proposed version of a system intended to retain
discretion but remove abuse would assign the redistricting process to
an existing nonpartisan body of experienced technocrats. 33 This

32. Id. at 420–21.
33. Many believe that Iowa’s redistricting process fits this model. In truth, the structure in
Iowa is substantially more complex. In Iowa, the body at the center of the process is the
Legislative Services Agency (LSA), a body of civil servants committed to nonpartisanship and
charged with, inter alia, legal and fiscal analysis of state legislation and state government
oversight. IOWA CODE ANN. § 2A.1 (2010). The LSA prepares draft redistricting plans under
criteria set almost entirely by statute; where the statutory criteria leave discretionary latitude, the
LSA looks for guidance to a five-person citizens’ commission appointed by the legislative
leadership and charged with holding hearings to seek public input. Id. §§ 42.4–.6. When the first
set of plans is presented, the legislature may accept or reject them without modification; if they
are rejected, the LSA will prepare another set using the legislature’s feedback. Id. § 42.3. Those
plans may also be accepted or rejected without modification; if they are rejected, the LSA will
prepare a third and final set of plans, which may be modified at the legislature’s discretion. Id.
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neutral body would be given several broad objectives and would
create priorities and resolve conflicts as it saw fit.
The technocratic solution is familiar but, in this context, flawed.
First, this approach assumes that neutral nonpartisan stewards could
be identified and that they would retain their nonpartisanship
throughout the redistricting enterprise—an assumption that many
question. 34 Second, even if Platonic nonpartisan stewards could be
found, technocratic decision procedures are most appropriate when
there exists widespread consensus about the goals of the process in
question and few thorny redistributive tangles, and when the primary
difficulty is in the application of these agreed-upon principles. 35In
redistricting, this latter criterion is likely met, if at all, only in the
abstract. All else equal, there is likely little disagreement that
districts should optimally be of roughly equal size; reflect legitimate
cohesive communities, including communities of racial and ethnic
minorities; maximize the representation that voters perceive they
have; establish fair partisan opportunity; reflect geographic areas that
are relatively close together; track existing political boundaries; and
provide meaningful choices in primary and general elections. 36 Dig
deeper, and disagreement soon emerges within any general category
about the more specific aim: as just one example, in considering
districts of roughly equal size, analysts take notably different
approaches to tolerance for population disparity 37 and the

That is, Iowa’s process is in many ways only structurally nonpartisan in the most
ministerial aspects of the redistricting exercise. Overall policy choices have been made by the
legislature, discretion within those choices is informed by the decisions of a partisan-selected
independent citizen body, and the outcome is subject to substantial legislative review.
Historically, this structure has been applied in a manner revealing substantial legislative
self-restraint that may well be unique to Iowa’s political culture. For example, although the Iowa
legislature has the ability under this scheme to reject three LSA plans and then entirely substitute
its own, it has thus far not chosen to do so. Furthermore, the entire procedure described above is
statutory and subject to repeal or revision by the legislature at any time. Again, since the
procedure’s inception in 1980, the legislature has left the structure in place.
34. See, e.g., Persily, supra note 24, at 674–76.
35. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1211–16
(2008).
36. LEVITT, supra note 17, at 44.
37. See ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., COMM. ON ELECTION LAW, A PROPOSED
NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO EMANCIPATE REDISTRICTING FROM
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS 9, app. at C-1-3, app. at D (2007), available at
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/redistricting_report03071.pdf.
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composition of the population base. 38 Prioritizing among these aims
when they conflict—indeed, several of these goals necessarily
conflict—is the subject of vigorous and widespread disagreement
among those who analyze or participate in the redistricting process,
and the choice of priorities has serious redistributive consequences.
Here, the political aspect of redistricting is most prominent. A body
to resolve these political battles must have not only decision-making
power but also, given the contested nature of the choices, decisionmaking legitimacy. 39
F. Citizens’ Commissions
Thus, we arrive at a final alternative to legislative control of the
redistricting apparatus: citizens’ redistricting bodies. This approach
attempts to address both the concern with self-interest and the need
for a legitimate but flexible decision-making structure. It does so by
assigning the redistricting pen to a set of potentially partisan citizens
not directly beholden to incumbent elected officials. 40 Given the
pragmatic concerns with separately electing such a citizens’
redistricting body, 41 analysts have attempted to devise other means
by which citizen redistricters might be chosen with sufficient
legitimacy to validate the political choices inherent in the
redistricting exercise.
1. Legitimacy and Diversity
Some such proposals would rely on a random selection of
citizens registered to vote, much like a jury. In theory, such a
selection has the potential to mirror the relevant cleavages in the
jurisdiction as a whole. This ability to reflect the jurisdiction’s
composition is, in turn, important in lending legitimacy to the body’s
deliberations since the pre-political choices it makes will determine
the nature of the political representation that the jurisdiction receives,
at least until the next redistricting. 42

38. See Garza v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 773–76 (9th Cir. 1990); id. at 778–88
(Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
39. See Kang, supra note 20, at 688–89.
40. LEVITT, supra note 17, at 22, 73.
41. See supra text accompanying note 12.
42. See infra note 49.
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In practice, however, truly random selection is unlikely to
produce any individual single redistricting body that looks much like
the jurisdiction to be redistricted. Selecting a large number of
individuals at random from a broader pool will likely yield a
representative sample. But redistricting bodies must be relatively
small, in order to ensure their ability to deliberate effectively. And
the random choice of just a few members from a larger pool creates
the substantial potential for a redistricting body that looks little like
the jurisdiction as a whole. Accounting for the time and technical
capacity required of redistricting bodies further reduces the pool of
available individuals—and the likelihood that a random pool of
qualified and available redistricters would be representative.
Particularly for large and diverse states like California, choosing a
small number of available individuals at random is far more likely, in
any given draw, to yield a group that does not reflect the population
of the state as a whole than to yield a group that happens to do so.
In the jury system, there are arguments for accepting the
capacity of a single random draw to produce a nonrepresentative
petit jury panel; many of these arguments find solace in the
aggregate diversity of juries produced by random draw. 43
Redistricting, however, takes place in most areas only once every ten
years. This yields a remarkably small set of redistricting entities with
which to achieve diversity approximating the population as a whole
solely through repetition of a random draw.
Moreover, the jury system attempts to compensate for individual
nonrepresentative jury panels with tools designed for a different
measure of legitimacy: the degree to which the direct participants in
the system, the litigants, perceive the jury panel as fair. Each side is
given the opportunity to use voir dire and peremptory strikes to
increase the perceived fairness—or, at least, to decrease the
perceived unfairness—of any given jury panel with respect to the
43. These arguments include practical difficulties in assembling a representative petit jury,
see Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the
Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 142–44 (1996), and a normative commitment to the various
benefits of second-order diversity over the benefits of more representative individual panels. See
Heather Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005). In practice,
commentators note that exemptions from jury service may skew the composition not only of the
petit jury but also of the jury pool itself, perhaps reducing the solace provided by the presumption
that jury draws, in the aggregate, reproduce the diversity of the total population. See, e.g., JON M.
VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 272–80 (1977).
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panel’s ability to deliberate on that side’s own interests. 44 Similar
procedures to promote legitimacy are thornier in the redistricting
context. Jury-based litigation is designed to distill disputes to a single
decisional axis (e.g., results favoring the defendant more than the
plaintiff, or vice versa); the two primary adversarial stakeholders on
this axis are the parties using strikes to shape the fairness of the jury.
In contrast, redistricting decisions have many potential axes (e.g.,
political, racial, regional) and many direct stakeholders whose
interests may not be aligned. Even if it were possible to mitigate the
legitimacy gap of a randomly selected but unrepresentative
redistricting panel through procedures analogous to a jury-selection
strike, it is not clear who should be granted the power to wield such
strike authority.
Perhaps for these reasons, when citizens’ redistricting panels
have actually been convened in American jurisdictions, the
procedures for populating the panels have involved either significant
modifications of—or complete departures from—the random-draw
jury model. 45 In 2010, six states each placed primary responsibility
for drawing state district lines in the hands of a citizens’ group not
beholden to particular elected officials; all but Alaska did the same
for congressional district lines. 46
These six states’ redistricting bodies follow two primary models.
California has opted for the approach most like jury selection, albeit
with important modifications. A panel of independent state auditors
reviews would-be volunteers for California’s commission in a
process much like voir dire, screening applicants for conflicts of

44. Scholars vigorously dispute the degree to which peremptory strikes actually increase the
fair composition of a jury panel. See, e.g., Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious
Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005). To the extent that this
tool does not increase the perceived legitimacy of the petit jury, that deficiency merely highlights
the need to seek alternative selection procedures for a fair redistricting body.
45. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHO DRAWS THE LINES (2009), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Democracy/redistricting/
20100908.Redistricting.04WhoDrawstheLines.pdf (reviewing the selection mechanisms for
states’ independent commissions).
46. See ALASKA CONST. art. VI, §§ 3–4, 8; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; CAL. CONST.
art. XXI, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(2); WASH. CONST. art. II,
§ 43; CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 8251–53.6 (West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1502 (2006);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1-101, 102, 105 (2010); WASH. REV. §§ 44.05.030–.100 (2005). Several
local jurisdictions also rely on citizen redistricting bodies not beholden to particular legislative
officials. See, e.g., N.Y. CITY CHARTER §§ 50–52.
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interest and technical qualifications. 47 In addition to asking this panel
to gauge commissioner capacity, California explicitly requests that
the panel of auditors assemble its “venire” with partisan balance and
“appreciation for California’s diverse demographics and
geography.” 48 This “venire” is then subject to several peremptory
strikes by the majority and minority party leadership from each of
the two legislative chambers. From the remaining pool, eight
commissioners are selected at random from subpools divided by
partisanship, to ensure partisan balance even as the individuals are
randomly selected. Those eight then select six additional
commissioners, again from partisan subpools to preserve partisan
balance; as with the “venire,” the law expressly states that this choice
is to be exercised in a manner such that the final commission reflects
the racial, ethnic, geographic, and gender diversity of the state. 49
With careful attention to partisanship and demographic diversity at
each stage, California’s selection procedures depart from the jury
model in an attempt to foster representative diversity in the particular
body convened to perform redistricting. 50
47. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(a)(2), (d).
48. Id. § 8252(d).
49. Id. § 8252(g). Like most other states with a citizens’ redistricting body, California has a
commission that aims for partisan balance (equal numbers of Republicans and Democrats, plus
additional members from neither party) rather than a partisan composition that mirrors the
partisan makeup of the state. By contrast, in evaluating other demographic criteria, California
asks that its commission reflect the diversity of the state, rather than numerical balance. As a
consequence, partisanship is the only characteristic that is protected structurally on the
commission, such that a majority will not be able to impose its preferences on a dissenting
minority.
In part, this distinction may represent an assessment that substantive criteria to be
applied by the redistricting body—like the Voting Rights Act—adequately protect other interests
in the redistricting process. But the distinction may also reflect a presumption about the
comparative strength of partisanship as a motivating factor in redistricting, even among
individuals who are not themselves partisan elected officials. When partisanship is singled out as
the lone trait requiring balance, it presumes that commissioners would allow their partisan
allegiance to drive jurisdiction-wide redistricting decisions, to a greater extent than their
allegiance to any other group. In a future work, I anticipate exploring this singular designation of
partisanship as the lone trait with a built-in veto in the citizens’ redistricting context.
50. In this respect, California apparently hopes to derive legitimacy through the presumption
that individuals with various demographic characteristics will represent shared concerns of
communities with similar characteristics, even if not selected specifically by those
communities—a function known as “descriptive representation.” See HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN,
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60–63 (1967). Scholars have noted the tendency of this
descriptive representation to provide legitimacy in political institutions, see, e.g., Michael
Rabinder James, Descriptive Representation in the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, in
DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY 107–09
(Mark E. Warren & Hilary Pearse eds., 2008), though the comparative merits of descriptive
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The other states with citizens’ redistricting bodies employ a
different approach, turning away from the jury model entirely and
relying more heavily on derivative legitimacy gleaned from senior
elected officials. In all but Alaska, the legislative majority and
minority leaders of each house each choose a citizen to form the core
of the redistricting commission. 51 In Alaska, the two legislative
majority leaders, the governor, and the state supreme court’s chief
justice select the redistricting commissioners. 52 In the commissions
of these five states, any legitimacy flows (as with any appointed
office) from the appointing officials’ accountability. These officials,
in turn, presumably face interest-group pressure to appoint
commissioners responsive to the various organized voter blocs
within the state. 53
2. Independence
Despite legislative leaders’ role in the initial selection of
commissioners for the states above, each such state has taken steps to
ensure that the members of its citizens’ redistricting body are not
structurally beholden either to legislative leadership or to other
incumbents. So, for example, each of these states prohibits legislators
or other public officials from themselves serving on redistricting
commissions. 54 Each also prohibits commissioners from running for
office in the districts that they draw, at least for a few years. 55
representation as a means to further the interests of represented communities are hotly debated,
and beyond the scope of this Essay.
51. In Arizona, Montana, and Washington, these four commissioners then select a
tiebreaker, though Washington’s fifth member serves as the body’s chairperson but does not vote
on substantive redistricting proposals. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. V,
§ 14(2); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(2). In Idaho, the chairpersons of the two largest political
parties in the state each select a commissioner to join the initial four, for a total of six members of
the redistricting body. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2.
52. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8.
53. These bodies’ limited size (Alaska, Arizona, Montana, and Washington have five-person
commissions; Idaho’s commission has six members) may make it difficult to find commissioners
who adequately represent the various interest groups of the state. Moderately larger bodies may
increase the capacity for broader representation without substantially sacrificing the efficacy of
decision-making.
54. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8(a); ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3); CAL. CONST. art.
XXI, § 2(c)(6); IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2(2); MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(2); WASH. CONST. art.
II, § 43(3).
55. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8(c); ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(13); CAL. CONST. art.
XXI, § 2(c)(6); IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2(6); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-1-105; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 44.05.060(3) (2005).
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Arizona and California further bar legislative staff from serving on
their commissions. 56
These restrictions are not intended to screen every informed
political observer from participating in redistricting. Rather, they are
designed to ensure that a citizens’ redistricting body does not become
an exercise actually conducted by legislators with citizen stand-ins.
Although legislative leaders with the ability to choose commissioners
will certainly select like-minded citizens, including citizens with
similar partisan objectives, if commissioners do not further depend
on those who select them, there is little reason to believe that these
commissioners will feel obligated to act as the leaders’ proxies in
pursuing districts drawn to suit incumbents’ personal inclinations. 57
3. Potential Benefits
Placing the redistricting power primarily in the hands of private
citizens’ commissions has substantial upside potential in one primary
respect: it may avoid the direct conflict of interest created by
legislators’ personal stake in the redistricting outcome. Removing
this conflict of interest is not the same as removing “politics” from
the process or creating a “nonpartisan” decision structure. On the
contrary, it is to be expected that a redistricting commission will
engage in the substantially political task of reconciling competing
values—and that in doing so, the commissioners will incorporate,
among many other preferences and concerns, partisan aims either
explicitly or sub silentio. The power of the partisan impulse, for
example, may explain why partisan balance is built directly into the
structure of the statewide citizen redistricting commissions
implemented in practice. 58 Indeed, the decision to forego a
“nonpartisan” procedure is an acknowledgment that, because
virtually every redistricting decision has a predictable partisan

56. California, Idaho, and Washington also bar recent legislative lobbyists from serving on
their redistricting commissions. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(a)(2)(A)(iv) (West 2005); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 72-1502 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.050(2) (2005).
57. Washington adds an intriguing role for the legislature once its citizens’ commission has
drawn a map. The legislature may tweak the lines proposed by a citizens’ commission—but a
two-thirds vote is required to do so, the changes may affect only 2 percent of the population in
any given district, and the changes may not intentionally favor a particular party or group. WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 43(7); WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.100(2) (2005). The extent to which such
changes have, in the past, been deployed specifically to benefit particular incumbents is not clear.
58. See supra note 49.
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impact, it is preferable to recognize and balance partisan preferences
than to allow a predictable skew to take shape in an unintentional or
underhanded fashion. 59
Instead of striving for nonpartisanship or freedom from politics,
the principal value of a citizens’ commission is its ability to remove,
or blunt, purely personal interests that incumbent legislators are
largely free to indulge. That is, citizens whose job security is not
affected by the outcome of a redistricting process will feel far less
compulsion to distort otherwise coherent districts in the service of
punishing a competitor, ensuring access to a particular funder, or
capturing a personally salient landmark or facility that has little to do
with the remainder of the district’s representation. As a result, the
process fosters not only improved procedural fairness, but also
improved substantive fairness in the resulting districts.
Crucially, this vision of improved substantive fairness is based
only on the premise that districts drawn by an effective citizens’
commission will be drawn in a manner that does not allow the selfinterest of particular incumbents to dominate other legitimate values.
This Essay does not claim that citizens’ commissions will always
create districts that better achieve any other preferred substantive
goal, independent of the jurisdiction’s political geography and its
shared commitment to representational objectives. 60 For example, it
may be that in a given jurisdiction, districts would be more balanced
between Democrats and Republicans if incumbents did not draw
them—but this is not the necessary result of a citizens’ redistricting
process. The substantive outcome of any particular districting
scheme depends on both the goals that those drawing the lines pursue
and the political distribution of voters who live in the jurisdiction. 61
59. Even in Iowa, for example, where an agency whose nonpartisanship is rarely questioned
is primarily responsible for the drafting of redistricting plans, that agency's role is—at least
formally—largely administrative. The criteria that it applies are politically established. And
where applying those criteria requires the exercise of discretion or decisions among competing
value choices, the nonpartisan agency looks to a citizens’ commission of balanced partisan
composition for guidance. See supra note 33.
60. Put differently, the choice of a citizens’ commission removes a barrier to representation
in the public interest, but does not itself establish representation in the public interest.
61. This Essay therefore does not purport to confront recent studies examining whether
citizens’ redistricting commissions have accomplished (or could theoretically accomplish) various
substantive objectives, prominently including district competitiveness or legislator polarization.
See, e.g., Jamie L. Carson & Michael H. Crespin, The Effect of State Redistricting Methods on
Electoral Competition in United States House Races, 4 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 455 (2004); David
G. Oedel et al., Does the Introduction of Independent Redistricting Reduce Congressional
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What citizens’ commissions instead guarantee is the assurance that
the overriding value that districts represent is not particular
legislators’ self-interest.
4. Potential Detriments
Even with the capacity to avoid incumbents’ self-interest,
citizens’ redistricting commissions do not represent an unvarnished
benefit. Placing the redistricting power primarily in the hands of
private citizens’ commissions has potential downsides as well. While
careful design may mitigate some of these limitations, and careful
training others, it is important to recognize the potential downsides in
order to avoid them. At least four such limitations are relevant here.
First, any substitute for a legislative decision maker—
particularly when tasked with a process as fundamental as
determining the representative structure for the community as a
whole—risks a nontrivial challenge to its legitimacy. 62 That may be
mitigated somewhat if the body is itself elected, although beyond the
significant pragmatic difficulties with such an election, plurality
election processes might well lead to a body that represents only a
small portion of the jurisdiction to be redistricted. The legitimacy
concern might also be mitigated if the citizens’ redistricting body is
selected by trusted governmental officials or former governmental
officials who may draw on their own representative legitimacy. And
even with an unobjectionable selection process, the redistricting
body will draw legitimate objections that the people’s will has not
been represented in the redistricting process if the citizen
commissioners do not substantially reflect the diversity of the

Partisanship?, 54 VILL. L. REV. 57 (2009); Anthony E. Chavez, The Red and Blue Golden State:
Why California’s Proposition 11 Will Not Produce More Competitive Elections 58–75 (Aug.
2010)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=anthony_chavez. Substantive prioritization of these
objectives is a choice independent of the use of a citizens’ commission, and without prioritizing
these objectives, it is not clear why citizens’ commissions should more readily achieve them on
average. Indeed, it may be that citizens’ commissions are structurally designed to improve
competitiveness in only one primary respect: by limiting self-interest, they prevent incumbents
from drawing districts specifically to exclude particular promising competitors. See Justin Levitt,
Redistricting Reform, for the Right Reasons, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE BLOG (Nov. 12, 2009),
http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/redistricting_reform_for_the_right_reasons/
(discussing districts drawn to exclude particular challengers, in both primary and general
elections).
62. See supra Part IV.F.1.
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political community to be subdivided. 63 This diversity is difficult to
achieve randomly. And even with careful attention, it will be easier
to meet in some states than others. 64
Second, a commission of citizens poorly trained in the
redistricting process may fail to execute its task appropriately. The
principal responsibility of a redistricting body—any redistricting
body—is to apply various criteria reflecting principles of
representation or their proxies: drawing districts with roughly equal
population, in compliance with the Voting Rights Act, in ways that
may, for example, reflect various communities, roughly follow
political boundaries, or track areas that are more or less compact.
The redistricting body will also have to resolve conflicts among
those criteria when necessary, by deciding to apply criteria more or
less flexibly, or with greater or lesser priority, sometimes with state
statutes or case law as a guide. Some of these principles may be
complex, requiring substantial collection of data and nuanced
analysis of both that data and the applicable legal standards. A
commission of citizens poorly trained for the task may fail to abide
by legal mandates. 65 Alternatively, a commission of poorly trained
citizens, or those who lack confidence in the task, may simply defer
to staff for substantive judgments; if staff members are beholden to
particular incumbent legislators, such deference would merely
replicate the conflict of interest discussed extensively above. 66
The third potential downside relates to the second: rather than
creating legal error or exhibiting undue deference, a commission of
citizens unfamiliar with the redistricting process may end up
defaulting on difficult political judgments, prioritizing certain criteria
for the wrong reasons. People often reveal general preferences for
certainty over uncertainty, objectivity over subjectivity, and neatness
63. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 20, at 679–80 (describing objections to a 2005 California
proposal built around three retired judges); see also NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC.,
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION GROUP, INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS: REFORMING
REDISTRICTING WITHOUT REVERSING PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 4 (2010),
available at http://naacpldf.org/files/publications/IRC_Report.pdf.
64. For example, in a state with substantial diversity, it may be necessary to deploy a
substantially larger redistricting body to have an opportunity to reflect the diversity of the
jurisdiction itself. See supra note 53.
65. Poorly trained legislators, of course, may also fail to abide by legal mandates, but there
is also a substantial likelihood that some legislators with experience in the redistricting process—
or experienced legislative staff—would be available to limit at least unintentional failure.
66. See supra Part III.
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over complexity. These preferences may lead individuals with
redistricting authority to prioritize criteria with straightforward
mathematical or geometric consequences, even if those criteria are
deemed less important than their more qualitative alternatives or
seem counterproductive in terms of the representational philosophy
they support. Commissioners may decide, for example, that it is
legally or representationally preferable to draw districts reflecting
communities of shared political interest than to draw districts tracing
county lines; yet because it is straightforward to trace county lines
and more complicated to discern communities of shared political
interest, redistricting bodies may find themselves drawn to the
former at the expense of the latter. These preferences are not
absolute, nor are they unique to citizens who are not incumbent
legislators. But it may be more difficult for citizen commissioners
who are unaccustomed to the redistricting process to set these natural
proclivities aside.
The final detrimental potential of citizens’ redistricting bodies
discussed in this Essay is that expectations for an independent,
citizen-led process may be set too high, creating rather than reducing
public disillusionment with the political process. To the extent that
there is perceived political dysfunction—an empirical question with
a series of answers more complex than commonly assumed—
changes to the redistricting system cannot possibly solve all of the
perceived problems at once. Redistricting is but one element of a
process of electing representatives, operating within particular voting
systems and alongside campaign finance rules, ballot access
provisions, electoral procedures, candidate-recruitment structures,
term limits, general political trends, and a host of other factors
contributing to the selection of particular individuals to represent the
public. Those representatives then enter a legislative system with its
own structures and procedures, and perhaps its own structural and
procedural pathologies. If there are broader political ills impacting
satisfaction with government, changes in redistricting procedures
alone cannot possibly hope to correct them all.
Indeed, expectations for changes in the redistricting process may
be set too high even if they are set lower than wholesale political
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reform. 67 Some redistricting objectives, for example, are
fundamentally incompatible. Though it may be possible to draw
districts around whole cohesive communities or draw districts with
approximately the same number of Republicans and Democrats, it is
extremely unlikely that any map-drawer could accomplish both goals
in the same district, in districts throughout a state with California’s
political geography. This incompatibility is inherent in the political
task and would persist no matter what process were used to draw the
lines. Selling redistricting process change as a utopia of harmonized
objectives is selling a prelude to disappointment.
None of these potential downsides need be fatal to a citizens’
redistricting project. Citizen redistricters can be chosen in a manner
designed to reflect the diversity of the jurisdiction they will
subdivide. 68 Citizen commissioners can be trained to understand
legal and practical responsibilities and to exercise their human
capacity for qualitative judgment and complex problem solving. And
the benefits of a citizens’ redistricting process can be focused on its
capacity for eliminating a serious, and often overriding, conflict of
interest, rather than eliminating all of the political process’s
perceived ills. All of these elements, however, require concerted
attention to ensure that the potential of a citizens’ commission is
more positive than negative.
V. CONCLUSION
This Essay has discussed alternatives to legislative redistricting,
including the substantial potential in allowing citizens who are not
beholden to particular legislators to draw the lines. This includes
potential upsides: though the process will still be political, in the
sense that citizen redistricters will need to weigh and balance various
67. See supra text accompanying note 61 (noting the limited objectives that citizen
redistricting commissions are designed to achieve).
68. California’s nascent citizens’ commission appears to be well on the way. Sixty members
of the initial pool reflected the diversity of the state in a number of different respects. See
California Citizens Redistricting Commission: Frequently Asked Questions, WE DRAW THE
LINES, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/faq.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). Though the final
fourteen members of the commission were selected from this pool in part through a random
process, the commission ultimately empanelled also reflected the state’s diversity, albeit in some
respects more than others. See California Citizens Redistricting Commission: Commissioner
Biographies, WE DRAW THE LINES, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/bios.html (last visited Apr. 24,
2011). Only time will reveal whether the commission is actually perceived to legitimately
represent the redistricting priorities of the people of the state as a whole.
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conflicting representational values, it is unlikely to be driven by
particular politicians’ narrow interests in retaining their seats or
punishing their opponents. And if the selection process is designed to
foster balance and diversity, the resulting districts may well do a
better job at representing the preferences of the whole than does the
status quo. A citizens’ redistricting body also includes potential
downsides: citizen redistricters who are new to the process may be
drawn to easily maximized, quantitative criteria for where the lines
should fall or rely excessively on staff with similar concerns, at the
expense of more complex qualitative judgments that better reflect
normative judgments about representation. Navigating these straits
will be difficult, and the route traveled by California’s new citizens’
commission may prove an example—or a warning—about the
potential of further similar enterprises around the country.
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